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INTRODUCTION

LYNN S. BRANHAM*
On March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court discharged the legal equivalent of
“the shot heard round the world.”1 The shot was the Court’s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky.2 The world in which that shot reverberated was the world
of criminal justice.
Perhaps because I have taught and worked in the field of criminal justice
for so long, I confess that it is a rarity for a Supreme Court decision to take me
off guard. Of course there are Court decisions that I find disappointing—
misinterpretations, in my opinion, of legal rights. And then there are those
decisions, ones that I consider correctly decided, that evoke relief and even
delight. But because most of us steeped in the law have become so inured to
the reality that the Supreme Court can be, well, predictably unpredictable, the
decisions of the Court typically do not engender surprise, much less deep
surprise.
Padilla v. Kentucky is an exception to that rule. As will become evident
when reading the articles in this symposium issue, its implications for
criminal-justice systems in this country are profound and potentially even
stunning in their scope.
When Jose Padilla pleaded guilty to a drug-related crime, he undoubtedly
did not expect that his last name, like that of Ernesto Miranda,3 might become
a household word to criminal-justice practitioners. Originally from Honduras,
Padilla had lawfully lived in the United States for over forty years and served
in the military during the Vietnam War.4 After being charged with the
transportation of a large amount of marijuana in Kentucky, Padilla conferred
with his defense attorney about the impact a conviction would have on his
immigration status.5 His attorney told him “not . . . to worry”—that since
Padilla had lived in the United States for so long, a conviction would have no

* Visiting Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. 9 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Concord Hymn, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSON 158, 158 (1904).
2. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that police must give Miranda
warnings and secure a valid waiver before subjecting a person to custodial interrogation).
4. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
5. Id. at 1477–78.
3
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effect on his ability to remain in the country.6 The attorney was wrong. In
fact, the drug-related conviction, like most such convictions, would subject
Padilla to mandatory deportation from what had become his home country.7
Padilla claimed that he had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty plea invalid.8 In order
for a violation of this right to occur, counsel’s performance must have fallen
below the level of “reasonable professional assistance.”9 In addition, the
defendant must have been prejudiced by this deficient performance.10
In assessing whether Padilla’s attorney had provided unreasonable
professional assistance in derogation of the first prong of this Sixth
Amendment test, the Supreme Court could have endorsed the longstanding
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment applied in the lower courts. According
to that interpretation, a defense attorney only had to advise a client of the
“direct consequences” of a conviction, typically interpreted as those that are or
may be part and parcel of the sentencing order.11 The defense attorney, for
example, had to apprise the defendant of the maximum prison sentence that
could be imposed if the defendant pled guilty to a charged crime. However,
the attorney had no constitutional duty to advise the defendant of other
consequences that would or might ensue from a criminal conviction, such as
eviction from public housing, loss of employment, revocation of a license,
registration as a sex offender, or denial of voting rights. According to these
lower courts, advice about these so-called “collateral consequences” fell
outside the ambit of the “reasonable professional assistance” demanded by the
Sixth Amendment.12
The Supreme Court in Padilla alternatively could have applied an
exception that some lower courts had carved out to this general rule. Under
this exception, actual misadvice, like that which had been tendered to Padilla,
about the deportation repercussions of a guilty plea constituted the ineffective
assistance of counsel, provided the defendant was also prejudiced by that
erroneous advice.13
The Supreme Court, however, refrained in Padilla from placing its
imprimatur on the distinction that had been erected by the lower courts, when
defining the scope of defense counsels’ constitutional obligations, between the

6. Id. at 1478.
7. Id. at 1477 n.1, 1478.
8. Id. at 1478.
9. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
10. Id. at 692.
11. See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 334–36 (5th Cir. 2008).
12. See id. at 336 (“We, like our sister circuits, have drawn a bright line between the direct
and collateral consequences of a guilty plea and require that counsel advise a defendant of only
the former.”).
13. See Rubio v. State, 194 P.3d 1224, 1230 n.36 (Nev. 2008) (listing cases).
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“direct” and “collateral” consequences of a conviction.14 Nor did the Court
limit unconstitutional ineffectiveness of counsel to those instances when a
defense attorney has actually funneled incorrect information to a client about
the impact of a conviction on the ability to remain within the country.15
Instead, the Supreme Court held that a defense attorney’s failure to apprise
a noncitizen client of the deportation consequences of a conviction can violate
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.16 More
specifically, the Court ruled that when an immigration statute is “succinct,
clear, and explicit” in defining the impact of a guilty plea on the defendant’s
removal from the United States, the defense attorney must notify the defendant
that a conviction will result in his or her deportation.17 And if the law is not
“succinct and straightforward” in its explication of these deportation
consequences, the defense attorney still has a constitutional duty to advise the
noncitizen client that a conviction may result in the client’s removal from the
country.18
In February 2011, the Saint Louis University School of Law’s Public Law
Review, in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice
Section, convened renowned experts from across the country to discuss the
implications of the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Padilla. The
presenters included a federal district judge, a justice on a state’s supreme court
who was also a member of the state’s sentencing commission, a prosecutor,
several defense attorneys, an administrator of a federal probation office,
leading experts on immigration law, the law of sentencing, and plea
bargaining, and several individuals who have immersed themselves, for years,
in effectuating policy reforms governing what some are now calling the
“enmeshed penalties” of a conviction19—penalties other than those subsumed
within the sentencing order itself. The array of ideas propounded, both during
the symposium and in the articles that were its byproducts are, in my opinion,
truly groundbreaking.

14. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“We, however, have never
applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland. Whether that
distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique
nature of deportation.” (citation omitted)).
15. See id. at 1484 (rejecting this “affirmative misadvice” construction of defense counsels’
constitutional duties, in part because it might induce attorneys to refrain from discussing certain
pros and cons of a plea agreement with their clients).
16. Id. at 1486.
17. Id. at 1483.
18. Id.
19. In Padilla, the Supreme Court referred to how criminal convictions and deportation
have, under the law, become “enmeshed.” Id. at 1481.
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Professor Maureen Sweeney, Director of the Immigration Clinic at the
University of Maryland Carey School of Law, and her co-author, Hillary
Scholten, a former Board of Immigration Appeals accredited representative
and student at the law school, have written an article suggesting that Padilla
has provided the foundation for refinements in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. They note, with approval, the Supreme Court’s recognition in
that case that deportation is “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most
important part—of the penalty” that can ensue from a noncitizen’s guilty
plea.20 The authors then explain why deportation can therefore sometimes
constitute a grossly disproportionate punishment barred by the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And while the
authors concede that the Supreme Court usually accords a great deal of
deference to legislatures when assessing whether a penalty is grossly
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted, they argue that no such
deference is due when assessing whether deportation in an individual case or
for a particular category of crimes is a grossly disproportionate punishment.
The intriguing rationale for their conclusion is that Congress, not anticipating
the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, never considered deportation as part
of the penalty for a crime—that Congress never undertook the sentencingpolicy assessment to which, if undertaken, the courts must grant a degree of
deference.
Professor Stephen H. Legomsky, the John S. Lehmann University
Professor at the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis and
recently appointed Chief Counsel of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, has proposed in his article that Padilla’s constitutional implications
go far beyond a defense counsel’s obligations in the criminal-justice context.
He points out that by rejecting what can be considered a false dichotomy
between the “criminal” and “civil” consequences of a conviction, Padilla
embraced a “functional approach” to defining the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. After examining the
parallels between deportation and penalties traditionally considered “criminal,”
Professor Legomsky then concludes that Padilla, upon close examination, has
provided the foundation for recognizing that the constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel extends to deportation proceedings.
The article written by Professor Gabriel Chin, who teaches at the
University of California-Davis School of Law and served as the Reporter in the
drafting of both the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act21 and
the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards on Collateral

20. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (footnote omitted).
21. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2010).
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Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons,22 centers
on how Padilla should propel changes in the preparation of pre-sentence
reports. He recommends that pre-sentence reports be completed or at least
substantially completed in advance of plea negotiations. He notes that
funneling the information in these reports, such as the defendant’s criminal
history, to both parties at this point would yield a number of benefits, including
the making of better-informed decisions during the negotiation process.
Professor Chin furthermore urges that pre-sentence reports identify the
“relevant collateral consequences” stemming from a conviction of the crime
with which the defendant is charged. Incorporating into plea discussions such
consequences as the onus of being registered as a sex offender or the loss of
eligibility for student loans will then further the realization of the retributive,
deterrent, rehabilitative, or other objectives of a sentence. In addition,
consideration during plea discussions of what can be the draconian “collateral
consequences” of a conviction is dictated, according to Professor Chin, by the
tenets of basic fairness.
Stephanos Bibas, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
who shepherded Padilla, along with co-counsel, to a victory before the
Supreme Court, too recognizes the interplay between Padilla and plea
bargaining. He proffers a number of suggestions to more fully inform
defendants deciding whether to enter into a plea agreement or go to trial.
Perhaps most notably, he describes how safeguards like those afforded by
consumer-protection laws could be imported into the law governing plea
bargaining. Plea agreements then, for example, would have to be written in
plain English, and pro-defendant rules of construction could be devised,
thereby providing prosecutors an incentive to draft these agreements with
clarity.
Margaret Colgate Love, who served as U.S. Pardon Attorney for a number
of years and chaired the ABA task force that produced the standards alluded to
earlier on collateral sanctions and discretionary disqualifications, has written a
piece that, in part, contrasts the due-process standard governing the
information that a court must relay to a defendant in order for a guilty plea to
be valid with the information that a defense attorney is obliged, by the Sixth
Amendment, to share with the defendant. She notes that if the attorney’s duty
of advisement paralleled a court’s, the attorney’s advisement would be
superfluous, amounting, in effect, to no duty at all. Ms. Love then propounds a
test that she believes should define the scope of the defense attorney’s
advisement obligations under the Sixth Amendment. Under this test, counsel
must advise a client of what she terms “status-related consequences” of a
conviction that are severe, certain, and “of predictable importance to the
22. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d. ed. 2004).

AND
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client.” Ms. Love then concludes her article with several policy
recommendations designed to prevent enmeshed or status-related penalties
from destabilizing the plea process. One of these recommendations is to limit
the “collateral sanctions” that can ensue automatically from a conviction.
The next three articles examine Padilla from the perspective of insiders—
those who work within the trenches of the criminal-justice system. Robert
Johnson, a longtime prosecutor from Minnesota and former president of the
National District Attorneys Association, begins by emphasizing that
prosecutors are supposed to “seek justice,” not just secure convictions.
Drawing from that premise, he espouses the view that when making charging
and plea-bargaining decisions, prosecutors should take into account the
“collateral consequences” of a conviction as they assess what would be a just
disposition in a case. And, importantly, he profiles a question left open after
Padilla: Who has the responsibility to inform a pro se defendant of certain
consequences, such as deportation or sex-offender registration, that will or may
ensue from a conviction?
McGregor Smyth, an attorney who works at The Bronx Defenders and a
pioneer in what is called “holistic defense,” applauds Padilla in his article
because of its potential to unveil what he calls “the secret to great advocacy”—
a secret to which, it is evident, he has been long privy. At the center of a
criminal case, he reminds us, is a person. And that person often has pressing
needs and interests, involving such matters as housing, child custody, and
employment, that are intermixed with the criminal charges. Mr. Smyth relates,
in detail, how through the provision of integrated defense services—services
that address these needs and interests in accordance with priorities established
by the client, the quality of advocacy is enhanced dramatically. He describes,
for example, dispositions in criminal cases being altered as defense counsel
have educated judges and prosecutors about a conviction’s adverse
consequences, such as the loss of a professional license and ensuing loss of
employment—consequences that neither the judges nor prosecutors anticipated
or wanted.
Judge Robert Pratt, from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, also welcomes Padilla, though for a different reason. The
Supreme Court’s decision, he notes, has served as a needed reminder to some
judges who have routinized the guilty-plea process through boilerplate
questions and the elicitation of perfunctory responses to those questions. The
lesson for judges that Judge Pratt gleans from Padilla is that guilty pleas
should be accorded the same “respect and reverence” as a jury trial. And
Judge Pratt intones that during this solemn and significant plea process, judges
have an affirmative obligation to ensure that there has been “full disclosure” of
a guilty plea’s consequences to a defendant tendering that plea, including an
apprisal of the likelihood or possibility of deportation.
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Professor Michael Wolff, Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Study
of Law at the Saint Louis University School of Law, in his article proffers
observations about Padilla from the perspective of someone who has served as
the chair of the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission (as well as a
justice on the Supreme Court of Missouri). Having seen close-up the
operations of a sentencing guidelines commission, Professor Wolff reports that
it would be feasible for sentencing commissions to compile lists of the
consequences of a conviction in their state that traditionally have been
described as “collateral.” These lists would then facilitate defense attorneys’
imparting of information and advice to their clients and their development of
defense strategies, both during plea negotiations and at sentencing. And the
lists would be useful to other individuals within the criminal-justice system
making charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing decisions.
The thought-provoking articles written by presenters at the symposium
held at the Saint Louis University School of Law should prompt an
examination by the wide spectrum of individuals who handle criminal cases—
judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, probation officials, and others—of both
how Padilla changes, and should change, a status quo with which they may
have become, over time, a bit too comfortable. These articles also provide
much food for thought for policy makers, including legislatures and sentencing
commissions. One can only hope that a clearer understanding of the severe
impact that “enmeshed penalties” can have on defendants will spawn these
policy makers to institute reforms, both in the imposition of those penalties and
the way in which they are factored into decision making in criminal-justice
systems. These reforms, catalyzed in part by this symposium, will make our
justice systems more of what they are supposed to be. Just.
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